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Although the book-to-market (B/M) effect is vastly studied, the majority of the conclusions 
in prior analysis is only applicable to U.S. firms. In this work, we evaluate the performance 
of portfolios selected using three modified versions of B/M strategy applied to stocks listed 
in Euronext markets (Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels, and Lisbon) between 1993 and 2003. 
From the analysis of 4,715 firms across 11 years, 943 firms were elected as reference for 
portfolio formation. 
 
The modified B/M strategies use accounting information to segregate good from troubled 
firms. The first strategy follows Piotroski's (2000) nine signals to measure three areas of the 
companies’ financial situation and enabling to select firms from the high B/M quintile. The 
second strategy creates a portfolio from the intersection of high B/M portfolio with low 
accruals portfolios, following Bartov and Kim (2004) research design. The last strategy 
combines high B/M and low probability of bankruptcy, using the methodology described in 
Altman (1968) and Hillegeist et al. (2004). 
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This study shows that the average annual return observed by the high B/M portfolio is 
increased by 9.2% using the strategy developed by Piotroski (2000). Furthermore, there is 
clear evidence that the entire high B/M firms return distribution is shifted to the right when 
the score screen is applied. By opposition, other suggested alternative techniques pointed 
out in the literature using similar accounting and market data failed to prove as being a 
more efficient investment strategy 
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Value investing concerns buying (selling) stocks when their price is low (high) in relation 
to benchmarks such as earnings, cash flow, dividends, accounting book value, and 
historical prices. This approach assumes that while the “true” value for stocks is 
measurable and stable, their market prices fluctuate excessively in result of overoptimism 
or overpessimism, and short-term speculation, among other factors. Value investing is 
referenced as the opposite of glamour investing, where stocks are bought (sold) when their 
price is high (low) relative to fundamental benchmarks. 
 
Since Graham and Dodd (1934) that value investing is pointed as able to produce superior 
stock returns than glamour strategies and the overall market. The purpose of this study is to 
test specific value investing strategies, using the book-to-market (B/M) effect. The B/M 
ratio is calculated by dividing the accounting book value of equity by the market value of 
equity. According to prior research, a portfolio of high B/M firms outperforms a portfolio 
of low B/M firms and the overall market. Three modified B/M strategies that attempt to 
exclude a subset of firms for which the B/M signal is likely to be noise are examined in this 
work. Prior studies that compare different value strategies concluded that high B/M 
strategies produce better results over the long-term (Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok 
(1991)). 
 
The goal of this paper is to test if an investor can achieve a higher return over the long-run 
by using a simple accounting-based fundamental analysis strategy. If this can be obtained, 
then there will be evidence of some market inefficiency, since the information under use is 
widely available. 
 
Although the majority of the conclusions about the B/M strategy in prior studies is only 
applicable to U.S. firms, this work uses information from firms listed in all Euronext stock 
markets (Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels, and Lisbon stock exchanges). The methodology is 
based on a buy and hold performances of the three modified B/M strategies. The 
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performances are then compared against all stocks listed on Euronext, using market-
adjusted returns. 
 
This paper is organised as follows: we start by presenting the relevant literature, then we 
discuss the methodology and the data used, and finally we present the empirical results. We 
conclude by summarising the results and pointing out some plausible future research paths. 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Investment analysts have argued that value strategies outperform the market (Graham and 
Dodd (1934) and Dreman (1977)) for a long time. These claims have intrigued scholars 
since they are inconsistent with the market efficiency weak form hypothesis. In an effort to 
evaluate the validity of these claims, academics investigated the performance of value 
strategies, finding a number of strategies that produce superior returns over the long-run. 
Basu (1977), Jaffe, Keim, and Westerfield (1989), Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991), 
and Fama and French (1992) show that stocks with high earnings-to-price ratios achieve 
higher returns. De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) argue that extreme losers during a period 
of time outperform the market over the subsequent time period. Despite some criticism 
(Chan (1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989)), their conclusions had resisted testing (Chopra, 
Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992)). Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1984) 
find that average returns on U.S. shares are positively connected to the ratio between a 
firm's book value and the market value for common equity, according to Fama and French 
(1992) who extended previous results. Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) and 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) have also refined those conclusions. Finally, 
Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) show that a high ratio of cash flow to price also 
predicts higher returns. 
 
The results were extended to markets outside the United States of America: Chan, Hamao, 
and Lakonishok (1991) document a relationship between accounting elements and expected 
returns for the Japanese market; and Fama and French (1998) reveal the success of value 
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strategies applied to twelve developed markets. The majority of the studies that compare 
different value strategies conclude that high B/M investment strategies produce better 
performances over the long-run (Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991)). 
 
 
2.1. Book-to-Market Effect 
 
Prior research (Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991), Fama and French (1992), and 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994)) shows that high B/M firms outperform low B/M 
firms. Such strong return performance has been pointed out as being the result of either 
market efficiency either market inefficiency. 
 
According to asset-pricing theory, Fama and French (1992) characterise B/M as a variable 
grasping financial distress. In such a framework, returns constitute a fair compensation for 
risk. This interpretation is backed by a strong relation between B/M and financial measures 
of risk, such as leverage (Fama and French (1992) and Chen and Zhang (1998)). However, 
by showing that bankruptcy risk is not related to future returns, Dichev (1998) refutes the 
financial distress explanation for the B/M effect. 
 
A second explanation for differences between price returns associated to high and low B/M 
firms lies on market mispricing. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) argue that high 
B/M firms represent disregarded stocks where poor returns has conducted to the formation 
of negative expectations about future returns. La Porta et al. (1997) and Skinner and Sloan 
(2002) demonstrate that for high (low) B/M stocks, market participants underestimate 
(overestimate) future earnings, and that stock price reactions to future earnings 
announcements of extreme B/M stocks are consistent with the correction of the 
systematically biased expectations. If there is a mispricing associated to B/M effect in 
result of systematic bias in expectations, why don’t arbitrageurs exploit this opportunity 
erasing the mispricing? Shleifer and Vishny (1997) support that arbitrage is costly and that 
any systematic mispricing would not be quickly erased if arbitrage costs exceed arbitrage 
benefits. They show that risk due to the volatility of arbitrage returns reduces arbitrage 
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activity. Ali, Hwangb, and Trombley (2003) argue that the B/M effect is more important 
for stocks with higher return volatility, higher transaction costs, and lower investor 
sophistication, which is consistent with the market mispricing explanation for the anomaly. 
 
 
2.2. Modified Book-to-Market Strategies 
 
A possible approach to select stocks is to identificate a firm's intrinsic value or through the 
exploration of systematic errors in market expectations. Frankel and Lee (1998) suggest 
that investors buy stocks whose prices seem to be lagging fundamental variables.  
 
Undervaluation is detected combining analyst's forecasts with an accounting-based 
valuation model. According to them, this strategy produces significant positive returns over 
a three-year investment window, but, since high B/M stocks are neglected stocks, forecast 
data is liked to be scarce. Analysts are less prone to follow poor performing, low volume, 
or small firms (Hayes (1998) and McNichols and O'Brien (1997)). Therefore, a forecast-
based strategy may have little application for detecting value stocks. 
 
Several studies argue that investors can benefit from trading based on various signals of 
financial performance. These approaches try to obtain superior returns using the market's 
lack of capacity to fully process the implications of specific financial signals. Some of 
these strategies include post-earnings announcement drifts (Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin 
(1984) and Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990)), seasoned equity offerings (Loughran and 
Ritter (1995)), share repurchases (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995)), accruals 
(Sloan (1996)), and dividend omissions or decreases (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack 
(1995)). 
 
Piotroski (2000) and Bartov and Kim (2004) studied modified B/M strategies that seek to 
exclude a subset of firms for which the B/M signal is likely to represent noise. Piotroski 
(2000) shows that stock returns achieved from investing in high B/M firms increase 
substantially through the selection of financially strong high B/M firms. He developed an 
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aggregate score which results from adding up nine binary signals to measure three areas of 
the firm's financial condition: profitability, financial leverage/liquidity, and operating 
efficiency. Bartov and Kim (2004) model combines the B/M strategy and the accounting 
accruals anomaly (Sloan (1996)), that is, buying (selling) stocks with a high (low) B/M and 
low (high) accruals. Accruals are defined as net income before extraordinary items less 
cash flow from operations, scaled by the beginning of the year total assets. Accounting 
accruals may identify firms with extreme B/M due to expectational errors for two reasons: 
first, accruals have a mean reversion process, that is, unusually low (high) accruals are 
likely to reverse and eventually to increase (decrease) book values; and, second, the level 
of accruals may indicate the integrity of the reported book value. 
 
The basic intuition underlying these strategies is based on two possible explanations for a 
high B/M. The first is that the book value is mismeasured in result of some limitations 
underlying the accounting system of fairly priced stocks (wrong ratio numerator). The 
second explanation for an high B/M is mispricing due to expectational errors (wrong ratio 
denominator), that is, the book value is temporarily depressed, but the market considers the 
book value number to be fair due to pessimistic earnings expectations, reflecting the market 
tendency to extend past performance too far into the future (La Porta et al. (1997)). This 
expectational error will be corrected in the future when new information arrives to the 
market. To maximize portfolio returns, a B/M strategy should only select stocks with high 
B/M due to expectational errors. 
 
Although the success of the modified B/M strategies, there are no further studies on market 
outside the United States that compare different modified B/M strategies. The purpose of 
this paper is to fill this gap by applying three different modified B/M strategies to all firms 
listed in Euronext stock markets (Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels, and Lisbon stock 
exchanges). The first and second strategies are those developed by Piotroski (2000) and 
Bartov and Kim (2004). The third model combines high B/M firms with the bankruptcy 
probability, as defined by Altman (1968) and updated by Hillegeist et al. (2004). 
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3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
We started by identifying firms with shares listed in all Euronext markets (Paris, 
Amsterdam, Brussels, and Lisbon) between 1993 and 2003 with sufficient stock price and 
book value data available on Bloomberg Professional Service database. As in prior research 
(Bartov and Kim (2004)), we only selected ordinary common shares and excluded real 
estate investment trusts, foreign stocks, and close-end mutual funds. 
 
For each firm, we compute the B/M ratio at fiscal year-end, following Piotroski’s (2000) 
research design. For each fiscal year, we rank all firms with sufficient data in order to 
identify B/M quintiles. The prior fiscal year's B/M rank will be used to classify firms into 
B/M quintiles. The higher B/M quintile is then selected and its firms are used for the rest of 
the study. 
 
Four portfolio selection strategies will be used: Piotroski strategy, accruals strategy, and 
two versions of bankruptcy probability strategy. For each strategy a “good” and a “bad” 
portfolio will be selected. The first test will compare the returns earned by the “good” 
portfolio against the complete portfolio of high B/M firms. The second test will compare 
the returns earned by the “good” portfolio against the “bad” portfolio. Both tests use one 
year and two years raw returns and market-adjusted returns. The tests use the traditional t-
statistic and the binomial test of proportions. 
 
 
3.1. Piotroski Strategy  
 
Piotroski (2000) defines nine fundamental signals to measure three areas of the firm’s 
financial condition: profitability, financial leverage/liquidity, and operating efficiency. 
 
The profitability signals are: net income before extraordinary items and cash flow from 
operations scaled by the beginning of the year total assets (ROA and CFO); the current 
year's ROA less the prior's year ROA (ΔROA); and the current year's net income before 
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extraordinary items less cash flow from operations, scaled by the beginning of the year 
total assets (ACCRUAL). The financial leverage and liquidity signals are: the historical 
change in the ratio of total long term debt to average total assets (ΔLEVER); the historical 
change in the firm's current ratio (current assets to current liabilities) between the current 
and the prior year (ΔLIQUID); and the issue of common equity (EQ_OFFER). The 
operating efficiency signals are: current gross margin ratio (gross margin scaled by total 
sales) less the prior year's gross margin ratio (ΔMARGIN); and current year asset turnover 
ratio (total sales scaled by average total assets) less prior year's asset turnover ratio 
(ΔTURN). 
 
Each firm's signal is either “good” (with a value of one) or “bad” (value of zero). The 
aggregate score is defined as F_SCORE = F_ROA + F_CFO + F_ΔROA + F_ACCRUAL 
+ F_ΔLEVER + F_ΔLIQUID + EQ_OFFER + F_ΔMARGIN + F_ΔTURN. Given the 
underlying signals, F_SCORE can range from zero (worst) to nine (best). It is expected that 
F_SCORE is positively related with changes in future firm performance and stock returns. 
The firms with a F_SCORE of eight or nine will form the “good” portfolio. The firms with 
zero or one will form the “bad” portfolio. 
 
 
3.2. Accruals Strategy 
 
Bartov and Kim (2004) use B/M and accruals (net income before extraordinary items less 
cash flow from operations, scaled by the beginning of the year total assets) to form two 
independent portfolios, one consisting of “genuine” value stocks and the other of “genuine” 
glamour stocks. 
 
In this study, we use accruals to segregate “good” from “bad” firms. The “good” (“bad”) 
portfolio will include firms in the lowest (highest) accruals quintile selected from the 
higher B/M portfolio quintile. 
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3.3. Bankruptcy Probability Strategies 
 
Since the relation between bankruptcy risk and B/M is not monotonic and bankruptcy risk 
may not be reward by higher returns (Dichev (1998)), it is possible to achieve higher 
returns with a portfolio resulting from the intersection of the higher B/M quintile with the 
lower probability of bankruptcy quintile. 
 
In this strategy, the “good” (“bad”) portfolio will be composed by firms in the lowest 
(highest) bankruptcy probability quintile, selected from the higher B/M portfolio quintile. 
Two measures of probability of bankruptcy will be used: Altman's (1968) Z-Score and the 
updated indicator, Z-Scoreu, from Hillegeist et al. (2004). 
 
 
3.4. Calculation of Returns 
 
Firm-specific returns are measured as one year (two years) buy and hold returns. They are 
computed using stock prices observed at the end of the fourth month after the firm's fiscal 
year-end through one year (two years). We chose the end of the fourth month to guarantee 
that investors have all the necessary information at the time of portfolio formation, 
assuming a four-month period for firms to release yearly data and accounts. As in Piotroski 
(2000), if a firm delists, it is assumed that the delisting return is zero. If the delisting 
happens before one year (two years), the return compounding ends in the last month of 
trading. 
 
The market-adjusted return is defined as the buy and hold return less the value-weighted 









where is the market-adjusted return of firm i, Ri is the return of firm i, Mj is the market-
value of equity of firm j, and n is the number of all stocks listed in Euronext markets with 
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sufficient data. We assume that the higher B/M portfolio quintile selection controls for 
near-identical level of risk, since there is a strong relation between B/M and several 




All accounting and stock data were collected from Bloomberg Professional Service 
database. The initial sample contained 4,715 Euronext-listed firms with annual 
observations between 1993 and 2003. Applying the high B/M quintile screen to that initial 
sample yields a final sample of 943 firms with annual observations across 11 years. From 
now on the portfolio composed of all stock refers to this final sample, except regarding 
market-adjusted returns, which includes all the 4,715 firms, as defined previously. 
 
Between 1993 and 2003, the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx Index accumulated a total return of 
93.2% with seven positive years and four negative years. At the same time, the value-
weighted market return of all the 4,715 Euronext-listed firms was 127.2% with seven 
positive years and four negative years. 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. Evidence about Book-to-Market Effect 
 
Table 1 presents statistical information about the financial characteristics of the firms that 
form the higher B/M portfolio quintile. The average firm in the highest B/M quintile has a 
mean (median) B/M ratio of 2.152 (1.695) and a market capitalisation of 308.239 (24.850) 
millions of euros. As Fama and French (1995) noted, “firms with high B/M (...) tend to be 
persistently distress”: the mean (median) ROA is -0.001 (0.012) and the average and the 
median firms presents declines in the assets turnover ratio (-0.011 and -0.001, 
respectively). The majority of the firms have declines in ROA (54.0%), in gross margin 
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(56.0%), in liquidity (55.7%), in leverage (54.4%), and in turnover (51.5%) over the prior 
year. 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics about one year and two year buy and hold returns for 
the higher B/M portfolio quintile. As in Fama and French (1992), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1994), and Piotroski (2000), the high B/M firms earn positive market-adjusted 
returns in the one year and two year analysis, but, although there is a high mean and 
median performance, a big proportion of the firms (40.9% and 33.5% in one year and two 
years windows, respectively) produce negative market-adjusted returns. The 10th percentile 
and the 25th percentile market-adjusted returns of the high B/M firms are also negative. 
Therefore, as Piotroski (2000) explained, “any strategy that can eliminate the left-tail of the 
return distribution (i.e., the negative return observations) will greatly improve the 
portfolio's mean return performance.” 
 
 
Table 1: Financial Characteristics of High Book-to-Market Firms 








MVE 308.239 24.850 1,410.409 n/a 
ASSETS 3,755.996 125.800 30,930.763 n/a 
B/M 2.152 1.695 1.995 n/a 
ROA -0.001 0.012 0.127 0.639 
ROA 0.049 -0.002 1.185 0.460 
MARGIN 0.036 -0.004 2.250 0.442 
CFO 0.036 0.048 0.357 0.799 
LIQUID 0.149 -0.025 3.520 0.448 
LEVER 0.091 -0.001 2.665 0.456 
TURN -0.011 -0.001 0.367 0.485 
ACCRUAL -0.036 -0.048 0.381 0.224 
1
MVE = market value of equity at the end of fiscal year. Market value is calculated as the number of shares 
outstanding times share price. In millions of euros. 
ASSETS = total assets reported at the end of the fiscal year. In millions of euros. 
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B/M = book value of equity at the end of the fiscal year scaled by MVE. 
ROA = net income before extraordinary items at the end of the fiscal year scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. 
ΔROA = change in annual ROA. ΔROA is calculated as ROA at the end of the fiscal year less preceding year 
ROA. 
ΔMARGIN = change in the gross margin ratio between the fiscal year end and the preceding year. The gross 
margin ratio is defined as the gross margin divided by total sales. 
CFO = cash flow from operations scaled by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
ΔLIQUID = change in the current ratio between the fiscal year end and the preceding year. The current ratio 
is defined as total current assets divided by total current liabilities. 
ΔLEVER = change in the debt-to-assets ratio between the fiscal year end and the preceding year. The debt-to-
assets ratio is defined as long-term debt scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
ΔTURN = change in the asset turnover ratio between the fiscal year end and the preceding year. The asset 
turnover ratio is defined as net sales scaled by total assets. 
ACCRUAL = net income before extraordinary items less cash flow from operations at the end of the fiscal 
year, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
 
 
Table 2: Buy and Hold Returns from a High Book-to-Market Investment Strategy 

















One year returns        
   Raw 0.232 -0.382 -0.136 0.079 0.405 0.854 0.606 
   Market-adjusted 0.182 -0.416 -0.187 0.094 0.346 0.739 0.591 
Two year returns        
   Raw 0.666 -0.421 -0.107 0.322 0.975 1.939 0.690 
   Market-adjusted 0.493 -0.652 -0.190 0.280 0.799 1.555 0.665 
a
One year (two years) raw return = 12 (24) month buy and hold return of the firm starting at the end of the 
fourth month after fiscal year end. Return compounding ends earlier of one year (two years) after return 
compounding started or the last month of Bloomberg Professional reported trading. If the firm delists, the 
delisting return is assumed zero. Market-adjusted return = buy and hold return less the value-weighted market 




4.2. Piotroski Strategy  
 
Table 3 presents the returns to the investment strategy developed by Piotroski (2000) 
applied to Euronext firms between 1993 and 2003. Most of the higher B/M firms have 
mixed signals, obtaining composite scores, F_SCORE, between 3 and 7. Although only a 
small part of the observations (16.2%) get higher score (F_SCORE of 8 or 9) or lower 
score (F_SCORE of 0 or 1), the results in Panel A show that the one year raw return 
distribution shifts to the right when the Piotroski (2000) screen is applied. The 10th 
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percentile, the 25th percentile, the median, the 75th percentile, and the 90th percentile 
returns of the higher score portfolio are higher for all observations than the corresponding 
higher B/M portfolio quintile. However, there is no statistical evidence of a difference in 
the medians. On average, a higher score firm returned 11.0% more than a higher B/M firm 
over the first year period. An investor that bought high score firms and sold low score firms 
would achieve a higher return: an average (median) one year raw return of 36.4% (24.0%). 
The proportion of positive results of higher score firms (66.9%) is bigger than the 
corresponding proportion of all higher B/M firms (60.6%) and lower score firms (40.6%). 
The results obtained form the one year raw return analysis (Panel A) can be extended to the 
one year market-adjusted return analysis (Panel B). On average, a high score firm achieve a 
one year market-adjusted return 9.2% higher than a high B/M firms and 32.4% higher than 
a low score firm. 
 
The results from the two year analysis are not so clear. There is little statistical evidence 
that the higher score firms obtain a better result that the higher B/M firms over two year 
(Panel C), although it is obvious that a strategy that results in buying higher score firms and 
selling lower score firms registers an average and a median return improvement (81.2% 
and 44.3%, respectively) over the two year period. On the two year market-adjusted 
analysis (Panel D), there is no evidence that the return distribution is shifted to the right, 
since the 10th percentile, the 25th percentile, and the median returns of the higher score 
portfolio are lower than the corresponding observation for all higher B/M portfolio. 
However, the strategy that results in buying higher score firms and selling lower score 
firms keeps to show good results (72.5%). 
 
Therefore, we find empirical support for the conclusions achieved by Piotroski (2000), now 
extended to Euronext-listed firms between 1993 and 2003. This seems to be particularly 
true when we observe one year data: “Overall, it is clear that F_SCORE discriminates 
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Table 3: Buy and Hold Returns from Piotroski Strategy 
This table summarises buy and hold returns achieved by a strategy based on financial signals developed by 
Piotroski (2000). F_SCORE is equal to the sum of nine individual binary signals (F_SCORE = F_ROA + 
F_CFO + F_ΔROA + F_ACCRUAL + F_ΔLEVER + F_ΔLIQUID + EQ_OFFER + F_ΔMARGIN + 
F_ΔTURN). Each binary signal equals one (zero) if the underlying realisation is a good (bad) signal about 
future performance: F_ROA equals one if net income before extraordinary items at the end of the fiscal year 
scaled by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year is positive, zero otherwise; F_CFO equals one if cash 
flow from operations scaled by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year is positive, zero otherwise; 
F_ΔROA equals one if the change in net income before extraordinary items at the end of the fiscal year scaled 
by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year is positive, zero otherwise; F_ACCRUAL equals one if net 
income before extraordinary items less cash flow from operations at the end of the fiscal year, scaled by total 
assets at the beginning of the fiscal year is negative, zero otherwise; F_ΔLEVER equals one if the change in 
the debt-to-assets ratio (long-term debt scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year) between the fiscal 
year end and the preceding year is negative, zero otherwise; F_ΔLIQUID equals one if the change in the 
current ratio (total current assets divided by total current liabilities) between the fiscal year end and the 
preceding year is positive, zero otherwise; EQ_OFFER equals one if the firm did not issue common equity in 
the preceding year, zero otherwise; F_ΔMARGIN equals one if the change in the gross margin ratio (gross 
margin divided by total sales) between the fiscal year end and the preceding year is positive, zero otherwise; 
F_ΔTURN equals one if the change in the asset turnover ratio (net sales scaled by total assets) between the 
fiscal year end and the preceding year is positive, zero otherwise. The highest possible score for a firm is 9 
while the lowest is 0. The high score portfolio consists of all firms with a composite score of 8 or 9. The low 
score portfolio consists of all firms with a score of 0 or 1. High-All measures the return difference between 
high score portfolio and all firms portfolio. High-Low measures the return difference between high score 
portfolio and low score portfolio. 
Panel A: One year raw returnsa 
 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
All firms 0.232 -0.382 -0.136 0.079 0.405 0.854 0.606 943 
High score 0.342 -0.235 -0.056 0.116 0.561 0.906 0.669 121 
Low score -0.022 -0.515 -0.302 -0.124 0.374 0.580 0.406 32 





– – 0.331 – – 0.092
** 
– 











Panel B: One year market-adjusted returnsa 
 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
All firms 0.182 -0.416 -0.187 0.094 0.346 0.739 0.591 943 
High score 0.274 -0.365 -0.134 0.172 0.511 0.745 0.653 121 
Low score -0.050 -0.611 -0.385 -0.071 0.211 0.528 0.406 32 
High-All 0.092 0.051 0.053 0.078 0.165 0.006 0.062 – 




0.129 – – 0.169 – – 0.098
* 
– 










         
Panel C: Two years raw returnsa 
 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
All firms 0.666 -0.421 -0.107 0.322 0.975 1.939 0.690 943 
High score 0.763 -0.239 -0.015 0.387 0.929 2.123 0.727 121 
Low score -0.049 -0.727 -0.396 -0.056 0.191 0.534 0.438 32 
High-All 0.097 0.182 0.092 0.065 -0.046 0.184 0.037 – 
p-value
b 
0.257 – – 0.332 – – 0.216 – 











Panel D: Two years market-adjusted returnsa 
 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
All firms 0.493 -0.652 -0.190 0.280 0.799 1.555 0.665 943 
High score 0.553 -0.679 -0.231 0.244 0.882 1.788 0.661 121 
Low score -0.172 -0.936 -0.639 -0.157 0.335 0.685 0.375 32 
High-All 0.060 -0.027 -0.041 -0.036 0.083 0.233 -0.004 – 
p-value
b 
0.339 – – 0.403 – – 0.469 – 











One year (two years) raw return = 12 (24) month buy and hold return of the firm starting at the end of the 
fourth month after fiscal year end. Return compounding ends earlier of one year (two years) after return 
compounding started or the last month of Bloomberg Professional reported trading. If the firm delists, the 
delisting return is assumed zero. Market-adjusted return = buy and hold return less the value-weighted market 
return (all firms listed in Euronext stock markets with sufficient data) over the corresponding time period. 
b
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4.3. Accruals Strategy  
 
Table 4 displays the findings on buy and hold returns obtained with the investment strategy 
that uses accruals to segregate value firms (low accruals) from glamour firms (high 
accruals). The 10th percentile, the 25th percentile, and the median one year market adjusted 
returns (Panel B) of the value firms is lower than the corresponding observations for the 
higher B/M portfolio, which gives a clear signal that there is no evidence that this strategies 
shifts the return distribution to the right. Simultaneously, the 10th percentile and the 25th 
percentile returns are also lower than the corresponding percentile of the glamour firms. 
Thus, it seems that the accruals strategy just flattens the return distribution. The percentage 
of positive returns of the value firms is also inferior to the percentage of positive returns of 
the higher B/M firms and the glamour firms. There is also no evidence that the average rate 
of return difference between value firms (19.3%) and higher B/M firms (18.2%) differs 
from zero and the same applies to the average return difference between value firms and 
glamour firms (16.1%). All these differences present p-values that are far from 5% or 10%. 
Similar conclusions can be achieved from the one year raw returns (Panel A). 
 
The two years raw returns (Panel C) and market-adjusted returns (Panel D) show even 
worse results for the accruals strategy. There is statistical evidence that value firms earned 
less than the higher B/M firms. The mean (median) difference of -20.8% (-19.2%) in raw 
returns and of -20.7% (-17.7%) in market-adjusted returns are statistically different from 
zero. There is also evidence that there are more higher B/M firms and glamour firms with 
positive raw and market-adjusted returns than value firms. 
 
Overall, the results achieve by the accruals strategy do not give evidence supporting the 
conclusions presented by Bartov and Kim (2004). The findings do not show any evidence 
that “genuine” value stocks outperform “genuine” glamour stocks or the market average, as 
defined by Bartov and Kim (2004). 
 
 
Table 4: Buy and Hold Returns from Accruals Strategy 
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This table summarises buy and hold returns achieved by a strategy that uses accruals to separate “genuine” 
value firms and “genuine” glamour firms. Value portfolio consists of firms with accruals (net income before 
extraordinary items less cash flow from operations, scaled by beginning of the year total assets) in the lowest 
quintile. Glamour portfolio consists of firms with accruals in the highest quintile. Value-All measures the 
return difference between value portfolio and all firms portfolio. Value-Glamour measures the return 
difference between value portfolio and glamour portfolio. 
Panel A: One year raw returnsa 
 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
All firms 0.232 -0.382 -0.136 0.079 0.405 0.854 0.606 943 
Value 0.242 -0.507 -0.233 0.055 0.530 1.161 0.573 185 
Glamour 0.210 -0.322 -0.133 0.085 0.325 0.708 0.605 185 
Value-All 0.010 -0.125 -0.097 -0.024 0.125 0.307 -0.033 – 
p-value
b 
0.473 – – 0.355 – – 0.209 – 
Value-Glamour 0.032 -0.185 -0.100 -0.030 0.205 0.453 -0.032 – 
p-value
b 
0.342 – – 0.355 – – 0.245 – 
         
Panel B: One year market-adjusted returnsa 
 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
All firms 0.182 -0.416 -0.187 0.094 0.346 0.739 0.591 943 
Value 0.193 -0.505 -0.248 0.085 0.407 0.962 0.562 185 
Glamour 0.161 -0.337 -0.151 0.082 0.322 0.602 0.611 185 
Value-All 0.011 -0.089 -0.061 -0.009 0.061 0.223 -0.029 – 
p-value
b 
0.429 – – 0.441 – – 0.239 – 
Value-Glamour 0.032 -0.168 -0.097 0.003 0.085 0.360 -0.049 – 
p-value
b 
0.333 – – 0.483 – – 0.149 – 
         
Panel C: Two years raw returnsa 
 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
All firms 0.666 -0.421 -0.107 0.322 0.975 1.939 0.690 943 
Value 0.458 -0.622 -0.308 0.130 0.698 1.666 0.573 185 
Glamour 0.562 -0.327 -0.033 0.274 0.656 1.473 0.730 185 
Value-All -0.208 -0.201 -0.201 -0.192 -0.277 -0.273 -0.117 – 











Value-Glamour -0.104 -0.295 -0.275 -0.144 0.042 0.193 -0.157 – 
p-value
b 




Table 4: Buy and Hold Returns from Accruals Strategy – continued 
Panel D: Two years market-adjusted returnsa 
 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
All firms 0.493 -0.652 -0.190 0.280 0.799 1.555 0.665 943 
Value 0.286 -0.792 -0.441 0.103 0.585 1.351 0.557 185 
Glamour 0.391 -0.553 -0.205 0.165 0.543 1.249 0.627 185 










Value-Glamour -0.105 -0.239 -0.236 -0.062 0.042 0.102 -0.070 – 
p-value
b 




One year (two years) raw return = 12 (24) month buy and hold return of the firm starting at the end of the 
fourth month after fiscal year end. Return compounding ends earlier of one year (two years) after return 
compounding started or the last month of Bloomberg Professional reported trading. If the firm delists, the 
delisting return is assumed zero. Market-adjusted return = buy and hold return less the value-weighted market 
return (all firms listed in Euronext stock markets with sufficient data) over the corresponding time period. 
b





represent differences statistically significant at a 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
4.3. Bankruptcy Probability Strategy  
Table 5 reports findings on buy and hold returns of the bankruptcy probability strategy 
using Altman's (1968) Z-Score. There is no statistical evidence that the one year market-
adjusted returns (Panel B) is shifted to the right when selecting only low Z-Score firms 
between all higher B/M firms. The average (median) market-adjusted return of a low Z-
Score firm is 17.3% (13.6%), which is not statistically different from the average (median) 
return of a high B/M firm of 18.2% (9.4%). The same conclusions are drawn when 
comparing low Z-Score firms and high Z-Score firms. Apart from an increase in the 
percentage of firms with a positive one year market-adjusted return, the bankruptcy 
probability strategy doesn't seem to work. These results can be extend to the one year raw 
returns (Panel A), two years raw returns (Panel C), and two year market-adjusted returns 
(Panel D) analysis. 
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Table 6 presents findings when the updated measure, Hillegeist et al.'s (2004) Z-Scoreu, is 
used in the bankruptcy probability strategy. However, the results are even worse than the 
previous presented in Table 5. Panel B reports the one year market-adjusted returns. The 
10th percentile, the 25th percentile, the median, the 75th percentile, the 90th percentile, and 
the average market-adjusted return of the low Z-Scoreu firms are lower than the 
corresponding higher B/M firms. So, instead of shifting the returns distribution to the right, 
the low  Z-Scoreu strategy shifted the returns distribution to the left. The strategy that 
consists of buying low Z-Scoreu firms and selling high Z-Scoreu firms doesn't work too.  
 
The average (median) return difference is negative, and the proportion of positive market-
adjusted returns for lower Z-Scoreu firms is smaller than the corresponding indicator for 
higher Z-Scoreu firms. These conclusions can be extended almost with no changes to the 
one year raw returns (Panel A), two year raw returns (Panel B), and two year market-
adjusted returns (Panel D) analysis. 
 
 
Table 5: Buy and Hold Returns from Bankruptcy Probability Strategy (Z-Score) 
This table summarises buy and hold returns achieved by a strategy that uses bankruptcy probability to 
separate winner from losers. The Altman's (1968) Z-Score is used as the probability of bankruptcy (Z = -
1.20X1 – 1.40X2 – 3.30X3 – 0.60X4 – 0.999X5 where X1 = working capital scaled by total assets, X2 = 
retained earnings scaled by total assets, X3 = earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total assets, X4 = 
market value of equity scaled by total debt, X5 = sales scaled by total assets; the signs of the original 
coefficients have been changed so the Z-Score is increasing in the probability of bankruptcy; all coefficients 
except X5 have been multiplied by 100, since Altman (1968) express each variable aside X5 as percentages 
rather than in ratio form (see Hillegeist et al. (2004) for details)). Low Z-Score portfolio consists of firms that 
are in the lowest Z-Score quintile. High Z-Score portfolio consists of firms that are in the highest Z-Score 
quintile. Low-All measures the return difference between low Z-Score portfolio and all firms portfolio. Low-
High measures the return difference between low Z-Score portfolio and high Z-Score portfolio. 
 
Panel A: One year raw returnsa 
 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
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All firms 0.232 -0.382 -0.136 0.079 0.405 0.854 0.606 943 
Low Z-Score 0.222 -0.309 -0.116 0.098 0.468 0.854 0.632 185 
High Z-Score 0.210 -0.505 -0.208 0.035 0.381 0.819 0.562 185 
Low-All -0.010 0.073 0.020 0.019 0.063 0.000 0.026 – 
p-value
b 
0.420 – – 0.354 – – 0.252 – 
Low-High 0.012 0.196 0.092 0.063 0.087 0.035 0.070 – 
p-value
b 
0.441 – – 0.205 – – 0.073
* 
– 
         
Panel B: One year market-adjusted returnsa 
 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
All firms 0.182 -0.416 -0.187 0.094 0.346 0.739 0.591 943 
Low Z-Score 0.173 -0.350 -0.162 0.136 0.356 0.685 0.649 185 
High Z-Score 0.161 -0.520 -0.250 0.023 0.332 0.890 0.503 185 
Low-All -0.009 0.066 0.025 0.042 0.010 -0.054 0.058 – 
p-value
b 
0.417 – – 0.181 – – 0.075
* 
– 
Low-High 0.012 0.170 0.088 0.113 0.024 -0.205 0.146 – 
p-value
b 






Panel C: Two years raw returnsa 
 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
All firms 0.666 -0.421 -0.107 0.322 0.975 1.939 0.690 943 
Low Z-Score 0.571 -0.325 -0.045 0.241 0.806 1.490 0.681 185 
High Z-Score 0.518 -0.622 -0.326 0.162 0.627 1.566 0.562 185 
Low-All -0.095 0.096 0.062 -0.081 -0.169 -0.449 -0.009 – 
p-value
b 
0.217 – – 0.253 – – 0.408 – 
Low-High 0.053 0.297 0.281 0.079 0.179 -0.076 0.119 – 
p-value
b 
0.384 – – 0.331 – – 0.008
** 
– 
         
Panel D: Two years market-adjusted returnsa 
 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
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All firms 0.493 -0.652 -0.190 0.280 0.799 1.555 0.665 943 
Low Z-Score 0.400 -0.662 -0.232 0.206 0.648 1.132 0.643 185 
High Z-Score 0.346 -0.855 -0.507 0.040 0.538 1.387 0.535 185 
Low-All -0.093 -0.010 -0.042 -0.074 -0.151 -0.423 -0.022 – 
p-value
b 
0.214 – – 0.266 – – 0.294 – 
Low-High 0.054 0.193 0.275 0.166 0.110 -0.255 0.108 – 
p-value
b 




One year (two years) raw return = 12 (24) month buy and hold return of the firm starting at the end of the 
fourth month after fiscal year end. Return compounding ends earlier of one year (two years) after return 
compounding started or the last month of Bloomberg Professional reported trading. If the firm delists, the 
delisting return is assumed zero. Market-adjusted return = buy and hold return less the value-weighted market 
return (all firms listed in Euronext stock markets with sufficient data) over the corresponding time period. 
b









4.5. Graphical Analysis  
Figure 1 gives pictorial evidence about the previous inferences on the one year raw return 
analysis. Comparing the higher B/M firms returns distribution (Panel A) with the higher 
score firms returns distribution achieved with the Piotroski (2000) strategy (Panel B), it is 
clear that F_SCORE shifts the distribution to the right. The right tail is heavier while parts 
from the left tail vanished. Actually, there is no observation in the high score with a one 
year return smaller than -88.1%. 
 
As mention before, the accruals screen flattens the one year return distribution (Panel C). 
Although the 90th percentile return is 116.1%, 30.7% more than the corresponding 
percentile return of the higher B/M firms, the 10th percentile return is -50.7%, 12.5% less 
than the corresponding percentile return of the higher B/M firms. Both bankruptcy 
probability strategies, using Z-Score (Panel D) and Z-Scoreu (Panel E), don't seem to 
present any advantage over the simple higher B/M strategy. Although the left tails of the 
distribution seem lighter, there is no evidence of increased returns. 
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Table 6: Buy and Hold Returns from Bankruptcy Probability Strategy (Z-Score
u
) 
This table summarises buy and hold returns achieved by a strategy that uses bankruptcy probability to 
separate winner from losers. The Z-Score updated by Hillegeist et al. (2004) is used as the probability of 
bankruptcy (Z
u
 = -0.08X1 + 0.04X2 – 0.10X3 – 0.22X4 + 0.06X5 – 4.34 where X1 = working capital scaled by 
total assets, X2 = retained earnings scaled by total assets, X3 = earnings before interest and taxes scaled by 
total assets, X4 = market value of equity scaled by total debt, X5 = sales scaled by total assets). Low Z-Score
u
 
portfolio consists of firms that are in the lowest Z-Score
u
 quintile. High Z- Score
u
 portfolio consists of firms 
that are in the highest Z-Score
u
 quintile. Low-All measures the return difference between low Z- Score
u
 
portfolio and all firms portfolio. Low-High measures the return difference between low Z- Score
u
 portfolio 
and high Z- Score
u
 portfolio. 
Panel A: One year raw returnsa 
 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
All firms 0.232 -0.382 -0.136 0.079 0.405 0.854 0.606 943 
Low Z-Score
u 
0.163 -0.369 -0.154 0.079 0.336 0.854 0.611 185 
High Z-Score
u 
0.399 -0.395 -0.136 0.150 0.631 1.316 0.627 185 





– – 0.495 – – 0.448 – 





– – 0.210 – – 0.367 – 
         
Panel B: One year market-adjusted returnsa 
 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
All firms 0.182 -0.416 -0.187 0.094 0.346 0.739 0.591 943 
Low Z-Score
u 
0.114 -0.430 -0.201 0.093 0.308 0.731 0.600 185 
High Z-Score
u 
0.350 -0.504 -0.136 0.216 0.511 1.189 0.654 185 





– – 0.486 – – 0.408 – 







– – 0.128 – 
 
Panel C: Two years raw returnsa 
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 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
All firms 0.666 -0.421 -0.107 0.322 0.975 1.939 0.690 943 
Low Z-Score
u 
0.369 -0.376 -0.045 0.244 0.629 1.132 0.697 185 
High Z-Score
u 
0.759 -0.424 -0.108 0.321 0.961 2.366 0.697 185 





– – 0.167 – – 0.431 – 





– – 0.282 – – 0.500 – 
         
Panel D: Two years market-adjusted returnsa 
 Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % Positive n 
All firms 0.493 -0.652 -0.190 0.280 0.799 1.555 0.665 943 
Low Z-Score
u 
0.197 -0.714 -0.242 0.134 0.498 0.995 0.600 185 
High Z-Score
u 
0.588 -0.669 -0.187 0.297 0.868 2.071 0.065 185 















– – 0.105 – – 0.087
* 
– 
aOne year (two years) raw return = 12 (24) month buy and hold return of the firm starting at 
the end of the fourth month after fiscal year end. Return compounding ends earlier of one 
year (two years) after return compounding started or the last month of Bloomberg 
Professional reported trading. If the firm delists, the delisting return is assumed zero. 
Market-adjusted return = buy and hold return less the value-weighted market return (all firms listed in 
Euronext stock markets with sufficient data) over the corresponding time period. 
b
P-values are from t-tests, except for the proportions that are based on a binomial test of proportions. 
 
Figure 1: One Year Raw Return Histograms Between 1993 and 2003 
Panel A: Higher B/M firms 
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Panel B: Higher score firms (Piotroski strategy) 
 
Panel C: Value firms (accruals strategy) 
 
Panel D: Lower Z-Score (bankruptcy probability strategy) 
  
Panel E: Lower Z-Score
u






This paper evaluates the stock return performance of three modified versions of the B/M 
strategies using simple accounting-based fundamental analysis. The first strategy uses 
Piotroski's (2000) set of financial ratios to segregate winners from losers from the generic 
higher B/M portfolio. The second strategy combines higher B/M with low accruals in order 
Value Investing: The Book-To-Market Effect, Accounting Information, and Stock Returns 
 26 
to select firms with good financial prospects. The third strategy selects low bankruptcy 
probability firms from within the higher B/M portfolio quintile. 
 
Only one of the three strategies in this article resisted testing. It was shown that the annual 
mean return achieve by a high B/M firm is increased by 9.2% using F_SCORE developed 
by Piotroski (2000) when applied to a sample of European stocks during an 11 year period. 
A strategy that consists of buying potential winner and selling potential losers achieved a 
32.4% annual return between 1993 and 2003 when applied to a set of 943 firms elected 
from the top B/M ratio quintile of a sample of 4,715 firms listed in the four Euronext 
markets. Furthermore, there is a clear evidence that the entire high B/M firms return 
distribution is shifted to the right when the high score screen is applied. These findings 
allow an extension of Piotroski (2000) conclusions: “the results convincingly demonstrate 
that investors can use relevant historical information to eliminate firms with poor future 
prospects from a generic high B/M portfolio.” The return increase of 9.2% achieve using 
F_SCORE and the annual return of 32.4% obtained when buying potential winners and 
selling potential losers are bigger than the corresponding returns presented by Piotroski 
(2000) for the U.S. stock market (7.4% and 23.5%, respectively). 
 
This study suffers from a potential survivorship bias, even though many delisted firms were 
detected during data collecting. Another limitation of this paper is the potential inexistence 
of the assumed risk homogeneity in the higher B/M portfolio quintile. A possible future 
research can extend these conclusions using abnormal returns instead of market-adjusted 
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